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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jessica Lynn Wenzel appeals, challenging her conviction for possession
of a controlled substance. Specifically, she claims the district court erred by
denying her motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to execution of a
search warrant.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Wenzel with possession of hydrocodone, a controlled
substance. (R., pp. 41-42.) Wenzel moved to suppress all evidence, contending
the search of her wallet was unlawful. (R., pp. 75-76, 99-104.) The district court
concluded that Wenzel was an overnight guest at a residence when the police
executed a search warrant there and, pursuant to the warrant, searched
Wenzel’s purse and wallet. (R., pp. 120-33.) The district court concluded that
the search of the purse and wallet were within the scope of the search authorized
by the warrant. (R., pp. 133-36.)
Wenzel thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea preserving her right to
appeal the denial of her suppression motion. (R., pp. 149-50.) Wenzel filed an
appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 154-57, 162-64.)
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ISSUE
Wenzel states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Wenzel’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wenzel failed to show any error in the denial of her motion to
suppress evidence found incident to execution of a search warrant at the
residence where she was staying?
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ARGUMENT
Wenzel Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
Evidence Found Incident To Execution Of A Search Warrant At The Residence
Where She Was Staying
A.

Introduction
The district court applied Idaho precedent and concluded that, because

she was an overnight guest, the search of Wenzel’s purse was within the scope
of the search authorized by the search warrant. (R., pp. 133-36 (citing State v.
Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 820 P.2d 1235 (Ct. App. 1991)).) Wenzel argues the
district court erred in its application of the standard adopted by the Idaho courts
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6), but spends most of her brief requesting application of
legal standards different than the one applicable in Idaho (Appellant’s brief, pp. 712).

Because Wenzel has failed to claim that Idaho precedent should be

overruled, her argument based on authority outside the jurisdiction is irrelevant.
The claim of error under applicable Idaho authority is meritless.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
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State v.

C.

The Officers Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Search Warrant Because
Wenzel Was An Overnight Visitor To The House
“A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in

which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.”
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982). “The Court has generally
held that the reasonableness of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is
limited to the area that is capable of concealing the object of the search.” Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 388 (2009) (Thomas, J.
dissenting in part).
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests,
drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found. A
warrant to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would also
authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to
search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle
that might contain the object of the search. When a legitimate
search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been
precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and
containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments,
upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient
completion of the task at hand.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 821.
However, a warrant to search premises does not always include within its
scope the authority to search persons on those premises.
444 U.S. 85, 90-92 (1979).

Ybarra v. Illinois,

The holding in Ybarra “turned on the unique,

significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person.”
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). Because of this heightened
protection of persons, the authority under a warrant to search “cannot be
4

extended so as to constitute authority to search a person not connected in any
way with the place being searched, who merely happens to be on the premises,
and who is not mentioned or described in the affidavit of probable cause upon
which the warrant was issued.” Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79, 7980 (1920) (interpreting Idaho Const., art. I, § 17). As stated by the Idaho Court of
Appeals:
[I]n determining whether a search of personal effects violates the
scope of a premises warrant, the court must consider the
relationship of the object, the person and the place being searched.
Under this formula, there is a differentiation between the personal
effects of a person who is a usual occupant of the premises which
are to be searched and the personal effects of a transient visitor to
the premises. The personal effects of an overnight visitor would be
subject to a search, whereas the personal effects of a mere visitor
or passerby would not be subject to a search.
State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 880, 820 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis added, citations omitted). After finding that Wenzel was an overnight
visitor, the district court properly applied this standard and denied the
suppression motion. (R., pp. 133-36.)
Wenzel argues that because she was not both an overnight guest and
described in the warrant application the search of her purse was outside the
scope of the warrant. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) While it is true that the Court of
Appeals determined that Bulgin was both an overnight visitor and named in the
search warrant application, the legal standard it articulated did not require both.
Bulgin, 120 Idaho at 880-81, 820 P.2d at 1237-38.

Moreover, the Idaho

Supreme Court stated that a search warrant may not be extended where there is
both a lack of connection to the place and a lack of mention in the warrant
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application. Purkey, 33 Idaho at 281, 193 P. at 79-80. Under the legal standard
as articulated by the Idaho appellate courts, either a connection to the property
such as being an overnight guest or the establishment of particularized probable
cause in the warrant application includes a person within the scope of a search
warrant. Wenzel’s argument that both are required is without basis.
Not only is Wenzel’s argument contrary to the standard as articulated in
Bulgin and Purkey, it makes little logical sense.

Under Wenzel’s proposed

standard the only resident and sole proprietor of a drug house could avoid the
search of her purse if she were not named in the warrant application; as could
the temporary visitor to the drug house even if the state obtained its warrant
based entirely upon probable cause to believe that she was a drug dealer.
Wenzel next argues that this Court should adopt a different legal standard
for when a person may be searched pursuant to a search warrant for particular
premises.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-13.)

She has not, however, argued that

Purkey and Bulgin should be overruled. (Id.) The Idaho Supreme Court “will
ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown to have been
manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or
unjust.” State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations
omitted); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680
(1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”). Because Wenzel has
not argued that existing precedent should be overturned, she has failed to
present a viable argument for application of a standard other than that adopted in
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prior precedents of the Idaho courts.

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,

923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23
(1983) (the appellate court will not review actions of the district court for which no
error has been assigned and will not otherwise search the record for errors).
Both of Wenzel’s arguments fail. She has failed to show that the district
court misapplied the law that an overnight visitor is subject to search pursuant to
a search warrant for the premises and has failed to claim that the law should be
changed. She has therefore failed to show that the district court erred when it
denied her motion to suppress.
D.

Alternatively, The District Court Also Reached The Right Result Because
A Search Of Wenzel’s Purse Was Not A Search Of Her Person
Even if a search of Wenzel’s person were outside the scope of the search

authorized by the search warrant, Wenzel failed to demonstrate that a search of
her purse was a prohibited search of her person.

See McKinney v. State,

133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (where the lower court reaches
the correct result by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will
affirm the result under the correct legal theory). Wenzel notes, quoting Justice
Breyer’s concurrence in Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308, that purses are “repositories
of especially personal items that people generally like to keep with them at all
times” and that Justice Breyer was “tempted to say that a search of a purse
involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule
should govern both.” (Appellant’s brief, p 12.) Two things, however, are missing
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from Wenzel’s argument. First, Wenzel fails to mention that Justice Breyer then
concluded: “However, given this Court’s prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact
that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the
Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction.” Houghton,
526 U.S. at 308 (emphasis original). Justice Breyer ultimately concurred in the
majority’s rejection of the lower court’s holding that a passenger’s purse was not
subject to search and the Court’s holding that officers may search any container
“capable of concealing the object of the search” when searching a car with
probable cause.

See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-307 (majority opinion).

Second, Wenzel also fails to mention Idaho’s precedents on this subject.
In State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998), Newsom was
the passenger in an automobile searched pursuant to the arrest of the driver.
She challenged the district court’s determination that officers’ search of her
“purse was lawful incident to the arrest of the driver of the vehicle.” Id. at 699,
979 P.2d at 101. The Court held that the search incident to arrest exception
“does not authorize the search of another occupant of the automobile merely
because the other occupant was there when the arrest occurred.” Id. at 700, 979
P.2d at 102. The court noted that Newsom had testified that the purse was on
her lap, but when she tried to take it with her upon exiting the car the officers
ordered she leave it behind. Id. Under such circumstances “the passenger’s
purse was entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search and seizure as
the passenger herself.” Id.
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The Court also addressed the search of a passenger’s purse incident to
the arrest of the driver in State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000).
In that case, however, unlike in Newsom, Holland voluntarily left her purse
behind when asked to exit the car. Id. at 160, 15 P.3d at 1168. In reaching the
opposite conclusion as in Newsom, the Court stated that “Newsom stands for the
proposition that the police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it
within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place
it there for them.” Id. at 163, 15 P.3d at 1171.
In State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 178-79, 90 P.3d 926, 928-29 (Ct. App.
2004), officers arrested an occupant of a car on outstanding warrants. Officers
ordered Roe, another passenger in the vehicle, to exit so they could search the
car incident to arrest. Id. at 179, 90 P.3d at 929. Roe attempted to leave the
vehicle holding a pair of shorts, but was ordered to leave the shorts behind. Id.
Officers then found controlled substances in the shorts. Id. In addressing the
suppression issue the Court looked at Newsom, Houghton, and Holland and
concluded that some items like purses “can be considered part of the person,
much like the clothing a person is wearing,” but held that the shorts in question,
because they were not being worn, were not part of Roe’s person and therefore
were more akin to a container in the vehicle and thus properly searched. Id. at
182-83, 90 P.3d at 932-33.
Finally, in State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281 (Ct. App.
2015), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the search of a purse that was on
the seat next to the driver (and only occupant) of a car searched under the
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automobile exception.

The Court stated the case presented “a very refined

question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not
subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.”
Id. at 176, 357 P.3d at 1284.

The Court first rejected applicability of cases

addressing the search incident to arrest exception as opposed to the probable
cause automobile exception. Id. The Court then rejected the proposition that
different sorts of containers should be treated differently for purposes of the
automobile exception. Id. at 176-77, 357 P.3d at 1284-85. Ultimately, the Court
of Appeals limited the definition of a search of the person to the person and his or
her clothing, which did not include the purse. Id. at 177, 357 P.3d at 1285.
Wenzel failed to demonstrate that searching her purse was outside the
scope of the warrant. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a search of a
purse is not a search of the person. Easterday, supra. Even if a purse could be
deemed part of the person under some circumstances, the district court found
more credible the officer’s recitation of events, and rejected Wenzel’s claim she
requested to take her purse with her when she was required to leave the
premises so the search could be conducted. (R., p. 128.) Wenzel failed to
demonstrate that the search of the purse on the premises subject to a valid
search warrant was effectively a search of her person outside the scope of the
warrant.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wenzel’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of May, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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